Modern processors deploy a variety of weak memory models, which for efficiency reasons may execute instructions in an order different to that specified by the program text. The consequences of instruction reordering can be complex and subtle, and can impact on ensuring correctness. In this paper we build on extensive work elucidating the semantics of assembler-level languages on hardware architectures with weak memory models (specifically TSO, ARM and POWER) and lift the principles to a straightforward operational semantics which allows reasoning at a higher level of abstraction. To this end we introduce a wide-spectrum language that encompasses operations on abstract data types as well as low-level assembler code, define its operational semantics using a novel approach to allowing reordering of instructions, and derive some refinement laws that can be used to explain behaviours of real processors. In this framework memory models are mostly distinguished via a pair-wise static ordering on instruction types that determines when later instructions may be reordered before earlier instructions. In addition, memory models may use different types of storage systems. For instance, non-multicopy atomic systems allow sibling processes to see updates to different variables in different orders.
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Introduction
Modern processor architectures provide a challenge for developing efficient and correct software. Performance can be improved by parallelising computation and utilising multiple cores, but communication between threads is notoriously error prone. Weak memory models go further and improve overall system efficiency through sophisticated techniques for batching read and writes to the same variables and to and from the same processors. However, code that is run on such memory models is not guaranteed to execute in the order specified in the program text, creating unexpected behaviours for those who are not forewarned [1] . To aid the programmer, architectures typically provide memory barrier/fence instructions which can enforce thread-local order corresponding to the program text, but if overused fences can eliminate performance gains.
Previous work on formalising hardware weak memory models has resulted in abstract formalisations which were developed incrementally through communication with processor vendors and rigorous testing on real machines [2, 3, 4] . A large collection of "litmus tests" [5, 6] demonstrate the sometimes confusing behaviour of hardware. We build on this existing work and provide a programming language and operational semantics that runs on the same relaxed principles that apply to the assembler instructions. The semantics is validated against litmus tests from the literature, and then applied to model check some realistic concurrent data structures.
We begin in Sect. 2 with the basis of a straightforward operational semantics that allows reordering of instructions according to pair-wise relationships between instructions, and an overview of the results of the paper. In Sect. 3 we introduce our wide-spectrum language and an informal description of the instructions. In Sect. 4 we describe the semantics in more detail, and derive some properties that support algebraic and refinement-based reasoning as a basis for theorem proving. Later we show the instantiations of the thread-local definitions to three well-known weak memory models, TSO [7] in Sect. 5, ARM [4] in Sections 6 and 7 and POWER [2] in Sect. 8 . We then consider the implications of weak memory models on more complex algorithms in Sect. 9: we verify a simple lock [8, Sect. 7.3] , the Treiber lock-free stack [9] running on ARM and POWER, and find (and fix) a bug in an implementation of the Chase-Lev work-stealing deque (double-ended queue) [10] developed specifically for ARM [11] . We discuss related work in Sect. 10.
Contributions. This paper extends our earlier work [12] in the following ways:
• We address TSO.
• We take into account a more recent version of ARM.
• We compare our semantics to a larger set of litmus test results (over 18,000 in this paper vs. approx 1,000 in [12] ), and as a result handle more constructs (e.g., POWER's lightweight fences and eieio fences), and other types of constraints (e.g., address shifting).
• We apply the semantics to more case studies.
Instruction reordering in weak memory models

Thread-local reorderings
It is typically assumed processes are executed in a fixed sequential order (as given by sequential composition -the "program order"). However program order may be inefficient, e.g., when retrieving the value of a variable from main memory after setting its value, as in x := 1 ; r := x, and hence weak memory models sometimes allow execution to appear out of program order to improve overall system efficiency. Specifically, in the above case, the value 1 may be used for r in later calculations, possibly including writing to some other shared variable, without waiting for the update to x to propagate to all other threads in the system. While many reorderings can seem surprising, there are basic principles at play which limit the number of possible permutations, the key being that the new ordering of instructions preserves the original sequential intention.
A classic example of weak memory models producing unexpected behaviour is the "store buffer" pattern below [5] . Assume that all variables are initially 0, that r 1 and r 2 are thread-local variables, and that x and y are shared variables.
(x := 1 ; r 1 := y) (y := 1 ; r 2 := x )
It is possible to reach a final state in which r 1 = r 2 = 0 in several weak memory models: the two assignments in each process are independent (they reference different variables), and hence can be reordered. From a sequential semantics perspective, reordering the assignments in process 1, for example, preserves the final values for r 1 and x . Assume that c and c ′ are programs represented as sequences of atomic actions α ; β ; . . ., as in a sequence of instructions of a thread or more abstractly a semantic trace. Program c may be reordered to c ′ , written c r ⊑ c ′ , if the following holds:
1. c ′ is a permutation of the actions of c, possibly with some modifications due to forwarding (see below).
c
′ preserves the sequential semantics of c. For example, in a weakest preconditions semantics [13] , for all predicates P, wp(c, P) ⇒ wp(c ′ , P).
′ preserves coherence-per-location with respect to c (cf. po-loc in [3] ). This means that the order of updates and accesses of each shared variable, considered individually, is maintained.
We formalise these constraints in the context of pair-wise reordering of instructions below. The key challenge for reasoning about programs executed on a weak memory model is that the behaviour of c d is in general quite different to the behaviour of c
Reordering and forwarding instructions
We write α r ⇐ β if instruction β may be reordered before instruction α. For TSO the well-known weakening of instruction order is that loads can appear before stores (to different variables). If we let x and y be shared variables, r be a local variable, and v some value, we can represent this as x := v r ⇐ r := y where x and y are distinct. This rule applies to a specific case of assignment statements that correspond to assembler-level stores and loads; the relation is generalised to all assignments for TSO in Sect. 5.
We give the more complex rule for reordering of updates in the ARM and POWER memory models below. We use the notation e v ≁ f to mean that expressions e and f do not reference any variables in common; hence x v ≁ f can be read as "x is not free in f ". The related notation e sv ≁ f is weaker, requiring only that the shared variables of e and f are distinct. e v ≁ f iff the free variables of e and f are distinct (2) e sv ≁ f iff the shared variables of e and f are distinct (3)
Note that r ⇐ as defined above is symmetric, however when calculated after the effect of forwarding is applied (as described below) there are instructions that may be reordered in one direction but not the other. The relation is neither reflexive nor transitive.
Provisos (i), (ii) and (iii) ensure executing the two assignments in either order results in the same final values for x and y, and proviso (iv) maintains order on accesses of the shared state. If two updates do not refer to any common variables they may be reordered.
Proviso (i) eliminates reorderings such as (x :=1; x :=2) r ⊑ (x :=2; x :=1) which would violate the sequential semantics (the final value of x ). Proviso (ii) eliminates reorderings such as (x := 1 ; r := x ) r ⊑ (r := x ; x := 1) which again would violate the sequential semantics (the final value of r ). Proviso (iii) eliminates reorderings such as (r := y ; y := 1) r ⊑ (y := 1 ; r := y) which again would violate the sequential semantics (the final value of r ). Proviso (iv), requiring the update expressions' shared variables are distinct, preserves coherence-per-location, eliminating reorderings such as (r 1 := x ; r 2 := x ) r ⊑ (r 2 := x ; r 1 := x ), where r 2 may receive an earlier value of x than r 1 in an environment which modifies x .
The instructions used in the above examples, where each instruction references at most one global variable and uses simple integer values, correspond to the basic load and store instruction types of ARM and POWER processors. We may instantiate (4) to such instructions, giving reordering rules such as the following, which states that a store may be reordered before a load if they are to different locations (r 1 :=y r ⇐ x := r 2 ). We use ARM syntax to emphasise the application to a real architecture.
In practice, proviso (ii) may be circumvented by forwarding. 1 This refers to taking into account the effect of the update moved earlier on the expression of the other update. We write β α to represent the effect of forwarding the (assignment) instruction α to the instruction β. For assignments we define (y := f ) x := e = y := (f [x \e] ) if e does not refer to global variables (6) where the term f [x \e] stands for the syntactic replacement in expression f of references to x with e. The proviso of (6) prevents additional loads of globals being introduced by forwarding.
We specify the reordering and forwarding relationships with other instructions such as branches and fences in the sections on specific architectures.
General operational rules for reordering
The key operational principle allowing reordering is given by the following transition rules for a program (α ; c), i.e., a program with initial instruction α.
Rule (7a) is the straightforward promotion of the first instruction into a step in a trace, similar to the basic prefixing rules of CCS [14] and CSP [15] . Rule (7b), however, states that, unique to weak memory models, an instruction of c, say β, can happen before α, provided that β α can be reordered before α according to the rules of the architecture. Note that we forward the effect of α to β before deciding if the reordering is possible. Applying Rule (7b) then Rule (7a) gives the following reordered behaviour of two assignments.
(r := 1 ; x := r ; skip)
We use the command skip to denote termination. The first transition above is possible because we calculate the effect of r := 1 on the update of x before executing that update, i.e., x := r r := 1 = x := 1. The definition of instruction reordering, α r ⇐ β is architecture-specific (instruction forwarding, β α , is constant for the architectures we consider). 1 We adopt the term "forwarding" from ARM and POWER [3] . The equivalent effect is sometimes referred to as bypassing on TSO [7] .
2 Typically this is the only definition required to specify an architecture's instruction
Reasoning about reorderings
The operational rules allow a standard trace model of correctness to be adopted, i.e., we say program c refines to program d , written c ⊑ d , iff every trace of d is a trace of c. Let the program α c have the standard semantics of prefixing, that is, the action α always occurs before any action in c (Rule (7a)). Then we can derive the following laws that show the interplay of reordering and true prefixing.
Note that in Law (10) α may be further reordered with instructions in c. Let c d denote program c running concurrently with program d . A tracebased interleaving semantics allows us to derive the following laws straightforwardly.
Law (11) is a typical interleaving law, and Law (12) states that refining either program, or both programs, results in a refinement of their composition. We leave the use of Law (12) , and properties such as commutativity, implicit in our derivations in this paper. We may use these laws to show how the "surprise" behaviour of the store buffer pattern above arises. 3 In derivations such as the following, to save space, we abbreviate a thread α ; skip or α skip to α, that is, we omit the trailing skip. ordering, but some behaviours may require specialised operational rules, e.g., see Sect. 6.3.
In addition, different architectures may have different storage subsystems, however, and these need to be separately defined (see Sect. 4.1). 3 To focus on instruction reorderings we leave local variable declarations and process ids implicit, and assume a multi-copy atomic storage system (see Sect. 4.1).
If initially x = y = 0, a standard sequential semantics shows that r 1 = r 2 = 0 is a possible final state in this behaviour.
Wide-spectrum language
In this section we give an overview of the syntax for our wide-spectrum language. Its elements are actions (instructions) α, commands (programs) c, processes (local state and a command) p, and the top level system s, encompassing a shared state and all processes. Below x is a variable (shared or local) and e an expression.
The basic actions of a weak memory model are an update x := e, a guard [e], a (full) fence, or a finite sequence of actions, α * , executed atomically. Throughout the paper we denote an empty sequence by , and construct a non-empty sequence as α 1 , α 2 . . . . ARM and POWER introduce other instruction types, especially different types of fences, which we discuss in the relevant sections.
A command may be the empty command skip, which is already terminated, a command prefixed by some action α, a choice between two commands, or an iteration (for brevity we consider only one type of iteration, the while loop).
A well-formed process is structured as a process id n ∈ PID encompassing a (possibly empty) local state σ and command c, i.e., a term (tid n lcl σ • c). We assume that all local variables referenced in c are contained in the domain of σ.
A system is structured as the parallel composition of processes within the global storage system. The typical structure is that of a global state, σ, that maps all global variables to their values, which models the storage systems of TSO, the most recent version of ARM [17] , and abstract specifications.
Older versions of ARM and POWER have a more complex storage system, though the structure of the overall system remains the same, as discussed in Sect. 7.1.
Abbreviations
Conditionals are modelled using guards and choice (where false branches are never executed).
By allowing instructions in c 1 or c 2 to be reordered before the guards one can model speculative execution, i.e., early execution of instructions which occur after a branch point [16] : see Sect. 6.1. Although the basic thread language is very simple (reflecting a sequence of instruction on a processor, or a trace in a denotational semantics model) we may construct more familiar imperative programming constructs in the usual way. Sequential composition of commands, as opposed to action prefixing, can be defined by induction.
Loops are modelled using unfolding, as in Rule (23) below. Read-modify-write primitives that allow atomic access of more than one variable can be modelled as an atomic sequence of steps. For instance, consider a fenced compare-and-swap (CAS ) instruction, where CAS (x , r , e) updates shared variable x to the value of expression e if x = r , and otherwise does nothing.
When used as the expression in a conditional we use the following abbreviation.
Operational semantics
The meaning of our language is formalised using an operational semantics, which, excluding the global storage system, is summarised in Fig. 1 . Given a program c the operational semantics generates a trace, i.e., a possibly Rule 21 (Prefix with reordering).
Rule 24 (Locals -update).
Rule 25 (Locals -store).
Rule 26 (Locals -load).
Rule 27 (Locals -guard).
Rule 28 (Thread id).
Rule 29 (Interleave parallel). −→ . . . where the labels in the trace are actions, or a special label τ representing a silent or internal step that has no observable effect. For brevity we omit rules that are a straightforward promotion of a label from a subterm to a parent term, i.e., rules of the form p
The terminated command skip has no behaviour; a trace that ends with this command is assumed to have completed. The effect of instruction prefixing in Rule (21) is discussed in Sect. 2.3. Note that actions become part of the trace.
A nondeterministic choice (the internal choice of CSP [15] ) can choose either branch, as given by Rule (22) . The semantics of loops is given by unfolding, e.g., Rule (23) for a 'while' loop. Note that speculative execution is theoretically unbounded, and loads from inside later iterations of the loop could occur in earlier iterations.
For ease of presentation in defining the semantics for local states, we give rules for specific forms of actions, i.e., assuming that r is a local variable in the domain of σ, and that x is a global (not in the domain of σ). The more general version can be straightforwardly constructed from the principles below.
Rule (24) states that an action updating variable r to value v results in a change to the local state (denoted σ [r := v ] ). Since this is a purely local operation there is no interaction with the storage subsystem and hence the transition is promoted as a silent step τ . Rule (25) states that a store of the value in variable r to global x is promoted as an instruction x := v where v is the local value for r . Rule (26) covers the case of a load of x into r . The value of x is not known locally. The promoted label is a guard requiring that the value read for x is v . This transition is possible for any value of v , but the correct value will be resolved when the label is promoted to the storage level. Rule (27) states that a guard is partially evaluated with respect to the local state before it is promoted to the global level. The notation e σ replaces x with v in e for all (x → v ) ∈ σ.
Rule (28) simply tags the process id to an instruction, to assist in the interaction with the storage system, and otherwise has no effect. Instructions of concurrent processes are interleaved in the usual way as described by Rule (29) .
Other straightforward rules which we have omitted above include the promotion of fences through a local state, and that atomic sequences of Rule 30 (Globals -store).
Rule 31 (Globals -guard).
Semantics of a standard (multicopy-atomic) storage system actions are handled inductively by the above rules.
Multi-copy atomic storage subsystem.
Traditionally, changes to shared variables occur on a shared global state, and when written to the global state are seen instantaneously by all processes in the system. This is referred to as multi-copy atomicity and is a feature of TSO and the most recent version of ARM [17] . Older versions of ARM and POWER, however, lack such multi-copy atomicity and require a more complex semantics. We give the simpler case (covered in Fig. 2 ) first. For the store model the thread ids are not used, but they do become important in later sections.
Recall that at the global level the process id n has been tagged to the actions by Rule (28) . Rule (30) covers a store of some expression e to x . Since all local variable references have been replaced by their values at the process level due to Rules (24)- (27) , expression e must refer only to shared variables in σ. The value of x is updated to the fully evaluated value, e σ .
Rule (31) states that a guard transition [e] is possible exactly when e evaluates to true in the global state. If it does not, no transition is possible; this is how incorrect branches are eliminated from the traces, which we discuss in more detail in the context of speculative execution in Sect. 6.1.
Reordering and forwarding (for sequential consistency)
It remains to define the reordering relation r ⇐ for particular architectures and the effect of forwarding so that the effect of Rule (21) can be determined; and to model the global storage system where the system lacks multi-copy x := e y := f = x := e [y\f ] if e has no shared variables (32) [e] y := f = [e [y\f ] ] if e has no shared variables (33) β α = β otherwise atomicity defined by the rules given above. We define the reordering relation in the following sections, though we may straightforwardly define the reordering for an atomic sequence of instructions recursively as below, where s is a sequence of instructions.
We define similarly for the cases s r ⇐ α. We note the trivial case for defining reordering for sequentially consistent (SC) processors: α r ⇐ β for all α, β, and there is no forwarding. Since reordering is not possible the second case of Rule (7) never applies and hence the standard prefixing semantics is maintained. SC semantics uses a storage system defined by the rules in Fig. 2 .
Forwarding, as given in Fig. 3 , is regular across all the architectures we have considered: α β , where α is an assignment y := f where f does not contain shared variables, is straightforward replacement of y by f in the expression of an assignment (32) or guard (33) . Otherwise forwarding has no effect. If forwarding was applied when f contained shared variables, e.g., when f is the expression z , this would create more loads of z resulting in potentially different values. This approach to modelling forwarding contrasts with an explicit FIFO buffer which is often used in modelling TSO. The most recent store to a global x is recorded in the program text, and need not be explicitly kept separately in a buffer structure.
Tool support and validation
The operational semantics have been encoded in Maude [18, 19] as rewrite rules. A process in the language is rewritten to a trace, with the Maude system generating all possible traces through backtracking. To validate the semantics of particular architectures and to verify data structures running on them, we devised a straightforward mechanism for checking the final state against a condition.
Modelling a particular architecture requires instantiating the reordering relation. For commercial reasons, formal definitions of the hardware are not provided by the vendors. To establish confidence in our semantics, therefore, we validated it against litmus tests, small assembler programs. We are fortunate in that considerable effort has gone into testing real hardware, collecting the results, and using these to fine-tune an understanding of the hardware for TSO, ARM and POWER. However, it must be noted that the use of litmus tests, and their results on hardware, are problematic for validation for several reasons:
• The set of litmus tests is unlikely to be complete.
• There may be a bug in the particular hardware tested giving incorrect behaviour.
• The particular hardware tested may not implement all features allowed by the memory model.
• The "specification" of the hardware may have imprecisions that resulted in vendors allowing behaviours that were intended to be forbidden.
• Expected behaviours can change as new hardware is released.
• The absence of a behaviour does not mean that it is forbidden.
Due to the above limitations, we do not attempt to achieve full conformance to the hardware results reported (where the above limitations are also noted), nor do we try to match exactly the results of other models -indeed some of the models themselves do not achieve full conformance, in particular allowing many behaviours that were not observed on hardware. Instead we aim to agree with litmus tests in the majority of cases, noting that refining a model to agree on all known litmus tests may quickly become redundant due to reasons above.
The litmus tests are provided in assembler syntax which we must translate to our wide-spectrum language. Branch instructions (e.g., ARM's BNE) are modelled using a combination of guards and nondeterministic choice. A guard [e] , where e is an expression, does not directly map from a hardware instruction. Abstractly, a command ([r = 0] ; c) means that if r = 0 in the local state then c may continue execution. If r = 0, then no execution is possible. As such, our guard corresponds to the guards in Dijkstra's guarded command language [13] . In our language we can use guards to model branching provided a straightforward structure is used, as outlined below. Let α i stand for instructions. The BNE L instruction jumps to label L if a special register is not equal to 0, while B L unconditionally jumps to L. Thus a structure such as the following
We have used the name cmpr for the local register implicitly accessed by the BNE instruction. Note that in our framework a branch instruction such as BNE in the assembler code structurally corresponds to a guard (covering the true and false cases). This structured programming approach to denoting branching cannot cover all possible jumps within hardware addresses, but is sufficiently expressive to capture the behaviours found in the litmus tests, and is suitable for modelling higher-level structured code. The reordering relation for TSO is given in Fig. 4 . It uses a multi-copy atomic storage system as defined by the rules in Fig. 2 . TSO is a relatively strong memory model with α r ⇐ β for all α, β except as specified in (42), which allows loads to come before independent stores.
TSO
In addition (42) allows independent register operations to also be reordered before stores, allowing forwarding (or bypassing). This means that a load of x may take the value of the most recently written value to x . In our framework, this means that if a load of x is reordered before a store to x , it takes that value. That is, since
from (32), we have
by Law (10) . Note that the instruction type changes from a load (r := x ) to a simple update to a local register (r := 1), and hence is not affected by any earlier stores to x . TSO's fence instruction can be employed to prevent the reordering of stores and loads (38,39).
Validation
We tested our definitions for TSO against the litmus tests mentioned in [7] and 25 generated tests using the herd tool (http://diy.inria.fr/herd/). Those litmus tests cover the essence of TSO, namely that loads can appear to come before stores, and forwarding (or bypassing) takes place.
Revised ARM v8
In this section we consider the latest (revised) version of ARM v8 which is multi-copy atomic [17] . We consider older versions of ARM which lack multi-copy atomicity in Sect. 7.
In addition to stores, loads, register operations, and full fences, ARM's instruction set includes a control fence, cfence, which affects local reordering by acting as a barrier preventing subsequent loads being reordered with earlier instructions. It is used in conjunction with branches to avoid the effect of speculative execution, discussed in Sect. 6.1. ARM also has a store only fence.
Our general semantics is instantiated for ARM processors in Fig. 5 which provides particular definitions for the reordering relation that are generalised from the orderings on stores and loads in these processors.
[b] Fences prevent all reorderings as with TSO (47,48), while a store-only barriers fence.st (corresponding to ARM's DMB.ST and DSB.ST instructions) maintains order on stores but not on other instruction types (49,50). A control fence cfence prevents speculative loads when placed between a guard and a load (51,52). Guards may be reordered with other guards provided they do not both access the same shared variables (53) (otherwise local coherence would be violated), but stores to shared variables may not come before a guard evaluation (54). This prevents speculative execution from modifying the global state, in the event that the speculation was down the wrong branch. An update of a local variable may be reordered before a guard provided it does not affect the guard expression and respects local coherence (55). Guards may be reordered before updates if those updates do not affect the guard expression and local coherence is respected (56). (Note that in ARM assembler the e sv ≁ b constraints for guards are always satisfied as guards (branch points) do not reference globals.) Assignments may be reordered as shown in (57) and discussed in Sect. 2.2.
Speculative execution
Many processors allow some form of speculative execution, where the instructions in a branch are tentatively executed and the effect stored locally while, for instance, waiting for a load of a global to be serviced. On TSO and related architectures the result of speculative execution are not visible, i.e., speculatively executed loads are restarted if it is detected that an old value was loaded. On ARM processors the effect of speculative execution can become visible, i.e., the effect of speculatively executing loads is not (conditionally) unwound. However, in all cases, if speculation was down a branch that was eventually determined to be incorrectly chosen, no effect is (or should be) visible. 4 Fortunately this complication can be handled straightforwardly in our semantics.
If a guard does not evaluate to true, execution stops in the sense that no transition is possible. This corresponds to a false guard, i.e., magic [21, 22] , and such behaviours do not terminate and are ignored for the purposes of determining behaviour of a system. Interestingly, this simple concept from standard refinement theory allows us to handle speculative execution straightforwardly. In existing approaches, the semantics is complicated by needing to restart reads if speculation proceeds down the wrong path. Treating branch points as guards works because speculation should have no effect if the wrong branch was chosen.
To understand how this approach to speculative execution works, consider the following derivation. This shows that the inner load (underlined) may be reordered before the branch point, and subsequently before an earlier load. Note that this behaviour results in a terminating trace only if r 1 = 0 holds when the guard is evaluated, and otherwise becomes magic (speculation down an incorrect path). On ARM processors, placing a control fence (cfence) instruction inside the branch, before the inner load, prevents this reordering.
Address shifting
In ARM the address an instruction loads from (or stores to) may be shifted. The instruction LDR R1, [R2, X] loads into R1 the value at address X shifted by the amount in R2. The presence of address shifting, or other mechanisms for modifying the address target of an instruction, can have an influence on the reordering relation, as captured by the addr relation in [3] . In our framework most of the restrictions introduced by address shifting are already captured by Rule (21), where we interpret 'x ' to range over expressions including address shifts such as y &+r , and hence the set of variables being checked against the conditions is {y, r }. However, as mentioned in [4] , an instruction x &+e := f has at least one other effect on reordering, which is that later stores cannot be reordered before it, in case the shift amount e gives an invalid address and results in an exception being thrown. In such cases, the effect of later writes should not be visible to other processes.
To precisely model the semantics of address shifting requires a more concrete model than the one we propose, however, as determined by the litmus tests of [4] , the effects of address shifting on reorderings can be investigated even when the shift amount is 0 (resulting in a load of the value at the address). As such we define x &+0 = x , and leave the effect of other shift amounts undefined. Note that when the shift amount expression is evaluated to 0 (e.g., by forwarding) the address shifting is removed and this can have an effect on the allowed reorderings.
Load speculation
A further aspect of address shifting is that in some circumstances a load r 2 := x may be reordered before a load r 1 := x &+e , even though this would appear to violate coherence-per-location. However, the load into r 2 must not load a value of x that was written before the value read by the load into r 1 . This complex situation is handled in [4] by restarting load instructions if an earlier value is read into r 2 . We handle it more abstractly by treating the load as speculation, where if an earlier value for r 2 is loaded then the effect of that speculation is thrown away (the point of allowing this reordering is apparently to allow execution after the second load to continue while the value of the shift amount e is calculated). This is given by the following operational rule. In practical terms it is possible the first load of x (into r 1 ) is delayed while determining the offset value. The later load is allowed to proceed, freeing up p ′ to continue speculatively executing until the dependency is resolved. The load into r 1 then must still be issued, the result being checked against r 2 . This check must occur to preserve coherency as the load into r 2 cannot read a value earlier than that read into r 1 . Note that loads in p ′ can now potentially be reordered to execute ahead of the load into r 1 .
Eliminating earlier writes
An additional aspect of ARM processors is that when there are consecutive writes to a variable x on a process the first write can effectively be eliminated: locally only the effect of the second write will be seen (sequential semantics is preserved), and globally it is always a valid behaviour that a sibling process did not see the effect of the first write because the second occurred immediately after it. Write elimination is captured by the following rule. c
We may derive the following elimination law.
Validation
The new version of ARM as reported in [17] is quite recent and the litmus tests used in that paper are not available at the time of writing. We have validated earlier versions of ARM which are more complicated, and as such we defer discussion of validation until Sect. 7.2.
Original ARM v8 and earlier -non-multicopy atomicity
In this section we consider the versions of ARM which lack multi-copy atomicity. These include the original version of ARM v8 [4] and all earlier versions. These versions of ARM allow processes to communicate values to each other without accessing the heap. That is, if process p 1 is storing v to x , and process p 2 wants to load x into r , p 2 may preemptively load the value v into r , before p 1 's store hits the global shared storage. Therefore different processes may have different views of the values of global variables; see litmus tests such as the WRC family [3] . To properly model these versions of ARM we must therefore introduce the storage subsystem, (storage ω • c), which replaces the (store σ • p) notation defined earlier.
Storage subsystem
We conceptualise the stores in the system as a list ω of writes w 1 , w 2 , . . ., with each write w i being of the form
where n is the process id of the thread that executed a store of value v to address x . The list S is a list of process ids that have seen this write, that is, loaded that value into some local register. For such a write w , we let w .var = x , w .thread = n and w .seen = S. For a write (x → v ) n S it is always the case that n ∈ S.
The order of writes in ω and previous values seen by a process affect the values it loads, which in general are nondeterministic. When a new write w is executed by a thread, w is not necessarily appended to the end of ω, but instead may be "inserted" earlier, according to certain rules. The basic principles of inserting a new write w of the form (x → v ) n {n} into the list ω are:
1. Request w may not come before any earlier write by n (local coherence). 2. Request w may not come before a write w ′ to x by another process that has been seen by n (global coherence).
When process n loads the value of location x from ω it may see either the most recent value of x that n has already seen, or any that have been added more recently in ω. When n sees some write w then n is added to the list of seen process ids in w . The shared state from the perspective of a given process is a particular view of this list. There is no single definitive shared state. In addition, viewing a value in the list causes the list to be updated and this affects later views.
Initially ω holds writes giving the initial values of the shared variables. These initial values are assumed to have been seen by every process.
We give two specialised rules (for a load and store) in Fig. 6 . To handle the general case of an assignment x := e, where e may contain more than one shared variable, the antecedents of the rules are combined, retrieving the value of each variable referenced in e individually and accumulating the changes to ω.
Rule (63) states that process n can load the value v for x provided there is a write (x → v ) m S in the system where all earlier writes can be "seen past", i.e., as given in (66), an earlier write to variable x has not been seen. As a result, n is added to the set of process ids that have seen that write (and hence later reads of x by n will not be able to see any earlier writes to x ).
Rule (64) governs where a new write w may be "inserted" into the global storage. Write w may appear earlier than writes that are already in system, provided it can be reordered with them as given in (67). We say w can come before a write v , written v w ⇐ w , provided v was by another process, and if it is a write to the same variable as w then it has not been seen. This constraint keeps all writes by a single process in the same order, and keeps a systemwide coherence on any one shared variable, but allows different processes to
Rule 63 (Storage -load).
Rule 64 (Storage -store).
Rule 65 (Storage -fence).
where
flush n (w ) = w [seen := PID] if n ∈ w .seen w otherwise (69) Figure 6 : Rules for the non-multi-copy atomic subsystem of ARM and POWER.
see updates to different variables in a different order. For instance, if the global storage contains writes to x and y by process n,
then process m may see that x has changed but read the initial value for y, while another process p may see that y has changed but read the initial value for x (assuming neither m nor p are in S 1 or S 2 ). Rule (65) states that a fence action by process n 'flushes' all previous writes seen by n (which includes those writes by n). The flush function modifies ω so that all processes can see all writes by n, effectively overwriting earlier writes. This is achieved by updating the write so that all processes have seen it, written as w [seen := PID] , and defined recursively by (68,69). A fence.st instruction also flushes the storage as in Rule (65).
Validation
The semantics was validated against 2 sets of litmus tests (with many overlapping tests). The first was a set of 348 litmus tests developed in [4] (we excluded some that could not be automatically translated, and also exclude one that involves shadow registers, for reasons described in Appendix A). We compared our results (pass/fail) against the expected results on hardware taken from the supplemental material for [4] 5 . The translation process was straightforward, with conditional statements translated into guarded branches as described in Sect. 3.1. In addition some redundant register operations were eliminated to reduce tool time, for instance, r := 1; x := r becomes x := 1 provided r is not used elsewhere in the code.
The majority of the tests (333) were performed in under 3s of processor time. Those with 3 or more processes, limited local ordering (lack of fences, etc.), and many writes, were the slowest. The Maude system measures rewrites and the largest test required approximately 50 million rewrites, taking 33s. Results of three of the 348 tests were not recorded in [4] as they did not complete in a reasonable time. Of the remaining litmus tests all but three agreed with the model results in [4] which we discuss below in Sect. 7.2.1.
The second set of tests we used for validation was the set of 9790 tests from [3] . These tests were used to validate an axiomatic semantics rather than an operational model as in [4] . Our results for this larger set, excluding 5 that did not parse and 133 that did not complete in a reasonable amount of time, is 9556 tests are in agreement with [3] and 96 in disagreement. Of those 96, we agree with the results obtained by hardware in 52: 5 where we allow a behaviour seen on hardware (but disallowed by [3] ), the remainder where our model says such behaviours should be forbidden (and were not observed on hardware). Of the remaining 44, all but 3 involve a store(x);store(x) or load(x);load(x) pattern; of those 3, 2 are identical (MP+dmb+addr-po-ctrlisb and MP0110). Those 2 identical tests are allowed in our model possibly erroneously, as they allow load speculation in the presence of an unresolved write with address shifting. The remaining test, MP+PPO015, looks like it is disallowed by us erroneously because we do not have "chain forwarding", or possibly forwarding from a register assignment, which is necessary inside a branch to resolve an address shift expression.
If we instead exclude from the 96 disagreements those tests involving address shifting we are left with 20 tests where we disagree with [3] . In all 20 cases we allow the behaviour that is disallowed by [3] (and which has not been observed on hardware). All of these 20 cases involve at least one instance of an access to a shared variable twice or more in at least one process, i.e., po-loc becomes relevant. By allowing more behaviours than [3] , we are erring on the side of soundness, i.e., if we can prove a program involving one of these 20 cases correct in our semantics, it is also certainly correct in the semantics of [3] .
We note that the results in [3] include 558 tests where their model forbids a result which was observed on hardware, and 1525 tests where the [3] model allows a behaviour which was not observed. Regarding the former, the discrepancy is attributed to the load-load hazard (e.g., [23] ) and fewer discrepancies remain between their model and hardware when the affected litmus tests are excluded.
Discrepancies with [4]
We present litmus test PPO017 below, 6 translated into our wide-spectrum language, for which our model gives a different result to that of [4] .
7 This is structurally similar to the test PPO015, discussed in [12] , and test PPO012: those two other tests pass in our model for essentially the same reason as PPO017.
x := 1 ; fence ; y := 1 r 0 := y ; r 2 := z &+(r 0 xorr 0 ) ; z := 1 ; r 4 := z ; (if r 4 = r 4 then skip else skip) ; cfence ; r 5 := x
The tested condition is r 0 = 1 ∧ r 5 = 0, which asks whether it is possible to load x (the last statement of process 2) before loading y (the first statement of process 2). At a first glance the control fence prevents the load of x happening before the branch. However, as indicated by litmus tests such as MP+dmb.sy+fri-rfi-ctrisb, [4] [Sect 3,Out of order execution], under some circumstances the branch condition can be evaluated early. We expand on this below by manipulating the second process, taking the case where the success branch of the if statement is chosen. To aid clarity we underline the instruction that is the target of the (next) refinement step. The load r 5 := x has been reordered before the load r 0 := y, and hence when interleaved with the first process from (70) it is straightforward that the condition may be satisfied.
In the Flowing/POP model of [4] , this behaviour is forbidden because there is an address dependency from the load of y into r 0 to r 4 , via z . In the (CMP) and branch-not-equal (BNE) instructions). We have also combined some commands, retaining dependencies, in a way that is not possible in the assembler language. The xor operator is exclusive-or; its use here (artificially) creates an address dependency [3] between the updates to r 0 and r 2 . The r 4 = r 4 empty conditional creates a control dependency (and with the control fence, a control fence dependency) between loads.
testing of real processors reported in [4] , the behaviour that we allow was never observed, but it is also allowed by the model in [3] .
POWER
POWER processors allow similar reorderings to ARM, as well as those aspects discussed in Sect. 6.1 to Sect. 6.3. Additionally, POWER includes so-called "lightweight fences", lwfence, which have both a local and global effect, and the similar eieio barriers. The reordering and forwarding definitions for POWER are otherwise the same as those in Fig. 5 ; we discuss how that relates to hardware tests in Sect. 8.2.
Lightweight fences
A lightweight fence, denoted lwfence, maintains order between loads, loads then stores, and stores, but not stores and subsequent loads (i.e., load;load, load;store, store;store, but not store;load). As shown in the reordering rule (72) of Fig. 7 we use two types of instruction to model the lightweight fence instruction. 8 These are "gates", with the storegate instruction allowing stores to "move backwards" and the loadgate instruction allowing loads to "move forward", as given by the reordering rules (73,74).
For instance, assume the following sequence of instructions, where l i are loads and s i are stores.
Assuming all loads and stores are to different variables and hence there are no pairwise constraints on reordering, application of the Laws (9) and (10) gives
Note that the order between loads, between stores, and between loads then stores has been maintained, but load l 2 may be reordered before the store s 1 .
In addition to a local constraint on possible reorderings, a lightweight fence also has a global effect on the storage system, which we encode in the semantics of the loadgate instruction (Rule (77)). Informally, a lightweight fence requires other processes to see changes to (different) shared variables in the same order as the process that wrote them. This is subtly different to a full fence, as we describe below.
Effect on the storage subsystem. As given in Rule (77) a loadgate instruction by process n has an effect on the storage ω similar to a full fence, but in this case all writes that n has seen (which includes all writes by n) are also tagged as lightweight-fenced by n by adding the lwf(n) tag to the seen part of a write. This is given by the recursive definition of lwflush in (79).
In the presence of lightweight fences the rule for a load (Rule (63)) changes to Rule (78). The change is that if process n sees a write by process m then it must also see any earlier writes by m that m has lightweight-fenced. This is given by the function see m n (ω) which simply marks any writes that are lightweight-fenced by m to be seen and lightweight-fenced by n. This transitive effect gives cumulativity of lightweight fences [3] .
The inclusion of a lightweight fence also has a subtle effect on the write order in the storage subsystem: the definition of write reordering as used in Rule (64) is updated to (81), where w 1 w ⇐ w 2 is defined so that write w 2 by n to x may come before write w 1 (to different variable y) provided that w 1 has not previously been lightweight-fenced by n.
In addition to lightweight fences POWER also includes an eieio barrier. Based on the discussion in [3] we treated this as a barrier on stores only (75,76). In addition an eieio barrier acts as a lightweight flush on the storage system as in Rule (77).
Validation
There are two litmus test resources we used. Firstly, we validated the semantics against a set of 758 litmus tests taken from the supplementary material of [2] 9 (the reason for more tests is due to the extra lwfence cases). As with ARM, some tests were excluded due to parsing issues.
As with the results from [4] , our model disagrees on the same three tests discussed in Sect. 7. 
Rule 77 (Storage -lightweight fence).
Rule 78 (Storage -load in presence of lightweight fences).
where litmus tests did not complete in a reasonable amount of time using the tool in [2] ).
10
The second set of tests comes from [3] . As we maintain the same ordering relationship for ARM and POWER, yet the POWER model in [3] was stronger, unsurprisingly our model disagrees with more cases for POWER. That is, of the 7820 successful runs (approx. 350 tests were excluded due to parsing or timeout problems) 550, or 7%, disagreed with the model in [3] or the hardware results.
11 Based on the discussion in [3] [Sect. 8.1] we conjecture that this is because forwarding, especially with respect to branches, is handled differently. However, given the conformance with the more recent 758 tests reported above, and for reasons discussed in Sect. 4.3, we have not pursued a specific change to our model to account for the discrepancies.
Instead we note that if we exclude litmus tests with multiple stores to the same variables in one process, multiple loads of the same variable in one process (i.e., po-loc issues), there are only 18 tests out of 3142 where our model disagrees with both the model in [3] and the POWER hardware they tested.
Verification of higher-level algorithms
We now show how our semantics and its Maude encoding can be used to investigate running programs expressed in our wide-spectrum language on architectures with weak memory models. Throughout we assume that simple assignments are atomic, noting where we use more complex constructs such as compare-and-swap and allocating a new node on the heap. The code listings are close to the Maude code used for verification, but are refactored from the sources in the literature to eliminate returns from inside a loop or branch, etc., so that the code is expressed in a straightforward structure that preserves the intended paths.
Locking
We analyse a simple lock/unlock algorithm for correctness under ARM and POWER (the code is taken from a version for Java in [8, Sect. 7 
.3]).
10 Litmus test propagate-sync-coherence was apparently not run on hardware, but our model's result agreed with that of [2] . 11 We note that the POWER model of [3] allows behaviours not observed in 1002 out of 8141 tests; there are no cases where the model of [3] forbids behaviour that was observed.
Initial state: {locked → false} unlock = locked := false lock = lcl success → false • while ¬success do success := ¬locked .getAndSet(true)
We use lcl to declare and initialise the local variable names used (registers in assembler code). An important part of the algorithm is that the unlock operation does not need to include a fence. The key line of code is success := ¬locked .getAndSet(true) which in our framework we treat as an atomic block with an implicit fence.
The primitive locked .getAndSet(b) atomically changes the boolean variable locked to b and returns the previous value of locked . Thus if locked is already true locked .getAndSet(true) has no effect and returns true; if locked is false then it becomes true and false is returned. The atomic action may be implemented using load-linked/store-conditional or compare-and-swap primitives, but we abstract from that and use an atomic block to define getAndSet. Note that the guard condition references a global variable. This is not possible in ARM or POWER directly, requiring a load of locked into a local register first, however we can straightforwardly accommodate this in our general semantics.
Model checking
To test this lock implementation provides mutual exclusion in ARM or POWER, we call lock ; unlock with an intervening abstract critical section, in which a flag per process is set to true/false on entry/exit, with one process setting a variable conflict to true if both are in their critical section at the same time. For model checking purposes we unfold the loop a finite number of times, giving a structure of nested branches. Many of the generated paths end with a guard testing success, which may be false; in which case that path is removed from the analysis.
The prototype tool was able to confirm mutual exclusion was satisfied for two concurrent processes with approximately 800 million rewrites in 14 minutes of processor time.
Treiber stack
We model the Treiber stack, a well known lock-free data structure implementing an abstract stack [9] , in which push and pop operations can be called concurrently. The operations are structured as potentially infinite loops which retry if interference occurs on the Head of the stack, otherwise succeeding and modifying Head atomically with a compare-and-swap instruction.
Initial state: {head → null}
The algorithm accesses the heap, which we model as individual shared variables (addresses) heap(0), heap(1), etc., which can be both assigned to and appear in expressions. An implicit shared variable maxh, initially 0, keeps track of the next free address in the heap. Addresses are allocated in order from 0. A node value is the term node(v , p) where p is a pointer (either a natural number index into the heap or null).
12
12 If pointers are freed and reused the algorithms suffer from the common "ABA problem", where a new node may reuse a heap location and cause a CAS operation to succeed where it should fail. The chances of this occurring in a practical setting can be made acceptably small by introducing modification counts to the pointers [24] . For our model
We assume the underlying system provides the following implementation of n := new Node(v ).
heap(maxh) := node(v , null) , n := maxh , maxh := (maxh + 1) , fence
That is, when a new node is allocated, the next available address is initialised to a new node value, maxh is incremented, the return value n is set to point to the new allocation, and a final fence ensures that all other threads see the effect on maxh atomically.
13
Updating the next or val part of a node also uses a shorthand, i.e., n.next := head is expanded to heap(n) := node(heap(n).value, head ), which overwrites the node's next pointer, but keeps the original value.
Verification
To verify this algorithm we compare the final values of the stack and the return values of the pop operations against those of an abstract specification of a stack (we do not prove termination). We use braces .. to enclose sequences and ⌢ for sequence concatenation.
The operations are modelled using atomic steps, and we model an explicit return value in the abstract specification. Although we check the values returned by pop, we do not attempt to relate intermediate values of the stack to their abstract counterpart, only the final value. Agreement on final values of the stack does give some confidence that incorrect values are not discovered during the execution; however we emphasise that this approach is an approximation of correctness only.
checking purposes we assume the system provides some garbage collection mechanism that avoids this problem and we do not explicitly model freeing nodes or avoiding the ABA problem.
13 Note that the fence does not affect variables other than maxh as there are no preceding instructions in push and all operations (potentially preceding the push) end with a CAS with an implicit fence (20) .
Nevertheless, the technique can potentially identify problems in running algorithms on weak memory models: the same technique exposed a flaw in a published algorithm, as discussed in Sect. 9.3.
We validate the code against the abstract specification by running a process p which is a combination of push and pop operations, for instance push(v ) pop. We then check that the heap and Head pointers abstractly give a valid stack, and the return values correspond with the expected abstract return values.
We ran 4 combinations of parallel processes (in addition to testing push and pop running in isolation), and all four gave the expected abstract behaviour. The most time intensive test involved three concurrent processes formed from a push and two pops. This required 103 billion rewrites and took 23 hours to return. These results give confidence that the Treiber stack algorithm will work on ARM and POWER-style weak memory models assuming CAS is implemented as in (20).
Chase-Lev deque
Lê et. al [11] present a version of the Chase-Lev deque (double-ended queue) [10] adapted for weak memory models. The deque is implemented as an array, where elements may be put on or taken from the tail, and additionally, processes may steal an element from the head of the deque. The put and take operations may be executed by a single thread only, hence there is no interference between these two operations, although the threadlocal reorderings could cause consecutive invocations to overlap. The steal operation can be executed by other processes.
The code we test is given in Fig. 8 . The original code includes handling array resizing, but here we focus on the insert/delete logic. As above, we have refactored the algorithm to eliminate returns from within a branch, and use CAS terminology for the atomic updates.
The put operation straightforwardly adds an element to the end of the deque, incrementing the tail index. It includes a full fence so that the tail pointer is not incremented before the element is placed in the array. The take operation uses a CAS operation to atomically increment the head index. Interference can occur if there is a concurrent steal operation in progress, which also uses CAS to increment head to remove an element from the head of the deque. The take and steal operation return empty if they observe an empty deque. In addition the steal operation may return the special value fail if interference on head occurs. Complexity arises if the deque has one element and there are concurrent processes trying to both take and steal that element at the same time.
Operations take and steal use a fence operation to ensure they have consistent readings for the head and tail indexes, and later use CAS to atomically update the head pointer (only if necessary, in the case of take). Additionally, the steal operation contains two cfence barriers (ctrl_isync in ARM). Our analysis suggests that the first control fence is redundant, and the second is incorrectly placed. Eliminating the first cfence and swapping the order of the second control fence with the preceding load into task gives the expected behaviour. We describe this in more detail below.
Verification
As with the Treiber stack we use an abstract model of the deque and its operations to generate the allowed final values of the deque and return values. The function last(q) returns the last element in q and front(q) returns q excluding its last element.
The abstract specification for steal is not precise as it does not attempt to detect interference and return fail. As such we exclude these behaviours of the concrete code from the analysis.
That the first control fence is redundant is shown by the following derivation.
h := Head ; fence ; t := Tail ; cfence; if . . . ⊑ Law (9) h := Head ; fence ; t := Tail cfence; if . . . ⊑ Law (10) h := Head ; fence ; cfence t := Tail ; if . . .
The control fence can be reordered before the previous load; it is now immediately after a fence, and has no further effect on reorderings of later instructions, and hence is redundant. Our model checking using the Maude encoding exposes a bug in the code which may occur when a put and steal operation execute in parallel on an empty deque. The load task := tasks[h mod L] can be speculatively executed before the branch is evaluated, and hence also before the load of tail . Thus the steal process may load head , load an irrelevant value for task , at which point a put operation may complete, storing a value and incrementing tail . The steal operation resumes, loading the new value for tail and observing a non-empty deque, succeeding with its CAS and returning the irrelevant value in task , which was loaded before the put operation had begun.
More concretely, the following reordering is possible (similar to the derivation in Sect. 6.1). We have removed the first (redundant) control fence, and we leave much of the structure summarised as . . . as it is only the first instructions that are relevant. (10) h := Head ; fence ; t := Tail ;
The access to local variable h in the index expression now precedes the load t := Tail . Hence, if h = t = 0 initially, the deque is empty, and the assignment return := tasks[h mod L] sets return to be the value at tasks[0], which is an irrelevant value. Now a sibling process may execute a put(v ) and insert v at tasks[0], after it has been read, and increment Tail . Then the original process resumes, reading t := 1, and succeeding the guard condition, eventually returning the default value at tasks[0]. The trailing cfence in the original algorithm has no effect on this possible reordering as it occurs after the load. Swapping the order of this second cfence with the load of task eliminates the above reordering, and our analysis did not reveal any other problems. In addition, eliminating the first cfence does not change the possible outcomes. The original placement of the control fence is unusual in that it comes after a load and before an atomic load and store. It is reasonable to assume that a CAS cannot be reordered before a branch since it involves a store to a global address. Therefore the placement of the control fence may indicate a minor misunderstanding of the subtleties of where a control fence must be placed to have the desired effect; certainly, a control fence appears to be required for the algorithm to work correctly.
We tested 5 combinations of the three (modified) operations in parallel (as well as testing single operations and combinations of put and take on a single thread). The longest test to complete was a push with two steal s, which required 2 billion rewrites and 35 minutes.
Related work
This work builds on a significant body of work in elucidating the behaviour of weak memory models in TSO, ARM and POWER via both operational and axiomatic semantics [7, 3, 2, 25, 4] . Those semantics were developed and validated through testing on real hardware and in consultation with processor vendors. We therefore had the easier task of validating our semantics against their results, in the form of the results of litmus tests. The intention of that body of work was to provide the foundation for higher-level verification of the sort that we have presented here.
More specifically, our model of the storage subsystem is similar to that of the operational models of [2, 4] . However our thread model is quite different, being defined in terms of relationships between actions. The key difference is how we handle branching and the effects of speculative execution. The earlier models are complicated in the sense that they are closer to the real execution of instructions on a processor, involving restarting reads if an earlier read invalidates the choice taken at a branch point. We instead use a more abstract formulation of branches as guards. Because speculative execution should have no effect if an incorrect choice is made, it is straightforward to eliminate such behaviours. However, the behaviour where the correct choice is (eventually) made contains that choice as a guard action, before which later actions may have been reordered (if allowed by the rules of the architecture). Our semantics is presented in a conventional operational semantics style, where actions appear in the trace. Unlike Plotkin-style operational semantics [26, 27] , we do not keep the state in the configurations, but as a first-order command of the language. This style interacts well with syntaxspecific behaviours such as distinguishing between behaviours for registers or shared variables. A similar approach is used by Owens [28] and Abadi & Harris [29] in operational semantics; using the syntax of labels is also used in a denotational semantics by Brookes [30] .
Our approach to modelling the non-multicopy atomic storage subsystem state is based on that of the operational model of [2] . However, that model maintains several partial orders on operations reflecting the nondeterminism in the system, whereas we let the nondeterminism be represented by choices in the operational rules. This means we maintain a simpler data structure, a single global list of writes.
The axiomatic models, as exemplified by [3] , define relationships between instructions in a whole-system way, including relationships between instructions in concurrent threads. This gives a global view of how an architecture's reordering rules (and storage system) interact to reorder instructions in a system. Such global orderings are not immediately obvious from our pair-wise orderings on instructions. On the other hand, those globals orderings become quite complex and obscure some details, and it is unclear how to extract some of the generic principles such as (4) .
We don't distinguish between ARM and POWER, and our model is less accurate to POWER with respect to the litmus tests than it is to ARM. The difference between ARM and POWER is accounted for in [3] by weakening the POWER model to obtain their ARM model, loosening the "po-loc" constraint, i.e., allowing loads and stores to the same variable on a process to not necessarily occur in program order. This is fundamentally against our basic principles for reordering and we can't directly represent the same change in our framework. However, many of the behaviours discussed in [3] as being peculiar to ARM were modelled by allowing forwarding (and eliminating earlier writes).
The model checking approach we developed exposed a bug in an algorithm in [11] in relation to the placement of a control fence. That paper includes a formal proof of the correctness of the algorithm based on the axiomatic model of [25] . The possible traces of the code were enumerated and validated against a set of conditions on adding and removing elements from the deque (rather than with respect to an abstract specification of the deque). As shown via derivations in Sect. 9.3.1 the reordering is straightforward to observe directly by looking at the code. The reordering relation for the ARM architecture show that the first control fence is redundant (does not prevent any reorderings) because it can be reordered to the previous fence. Similarly the load in the branch can come before the branch point itself (speculatively), and hence before the earlier load controlling the branch. The control fence, in its original position, does nothing to prevent this. The semantics of [3] does not uncover this anomaly as directly because it is more complex to construct the whole-code relations, while operational models that are more closely based on hardware mechanisms [2, 4] are more complex and obscure this relatively straightforward property.
Other approaches. Describing weak memory models has been tackled in a variety of other approaches. Our results agree broadly with those of [31] in that many reorderings cannot be explained locally only, and need a storage system for explanation. That work provides some results relating TSO, ARM and POWER, although that model does not handle control fences. Alglave and Cousot [32] develop an Owicki-Gries style proof method for concurrent algorithms in which the program text is annotated with invariants. The algebraic approach we adopt in is closer to the style of the Concurrent Kleene Algebra [33] , where sequential and parallel composition contribute to the event ordering.
Tool support and model checking. The tool we developed was written in Maude without any specific attempt to specialise for the performance issues of weak memory models. The number of interleavings of parallel processes is factorial in the total number of actions, and this explosion is compounded by local reorderings. The relatively simple algorithms in Sect. 9 became infeasible to model check for 4 or more parallel processes. Potentially we could restructure the semantics to develop partial orders on actions rather than traces, and hence benefit from other model checking approaches such as [34] . However, our tool does perform well on the litmus tests in comparison with the tools in [2, 4] , which did not report results for some tests that our tool was able to.
Conclusion
We have built upon earlier work to devise a model of relaxed memory which is relatively straightforward to define and extend, and which lends itself to model checking and formal analysis. While abstracting away from the details of the architecture, we believe it provides a complementary insight into why some reorderings are allowed, requiring a pair-wise relationship rather than system-wide.
We have described the ordering condition as syntactic constraints on atomic actions. This fits with the low-level decisions of hardware processors such as ARM and POWER, but variable references are not in general maintained by compilers (for instance, r := y × 0 may be reduced to r := 0, eliminating what is syntactically a load). Our main reordering principle (4) is based on semantic concerns: preserving sequential behaviour. As such our semantics may be applicable as a basis for understanding the interplay of software memory models, compiler optimisations and hardware memory models [35] .
One of the key aspects of our semantics is that it uses labels to describe the traces. Traditional Plotkin-style operational semantics [27] keep the state in the configuration of the rule, which makes it difficult, if not impossible, to determine the exact nature of an instruction executed by a subterm, and hence to check the constraints of the reordering principle (4) . In addition, the use of guards from Dijkstra's guarded command language [13] allowed an abstract treatment of speculative execution and the effect of early loads (loads occurring before a branch has been evaluated). Systems are specified in a term structure (14) which theoretically lends itself to algebraic manipulation, with the intention of being able to formally prove correctness of higher-level algorithms. The first steps towards this goal are taken in Sections 9.2.1 and 9.3.1.
fence in the first process. According to (4) reordering of any of the register operations in process 2 should be disallowed because there is a dependency (each references r 1 ). But it seems that the first two are collapsed into a load r 2 := y, and this can be reordered with r 1 := x as there is no dependency. This would be sound except that the value of r 1 should be preserved. This litmus test and surrounding discussion indicate that the final value of shadow registers should not be referenced, and that shadow registers are used for storing temporary calculated values. In this case, we do not need to model such registers for high-level code as they do not have the typical semantics of a local variable (one would instead use an explicit temporary variable rather than reuse a variable name such as r 1 ).
While we rule out shadow registers from consideration, we could straightforwardly extend our framework to allow them. This would require distinguishing them as a special variable type with tailored instruction types and liberal reordering relation. This change would be unlikely to affect the results of any other litmus test, since reusing registers does not typically occur; nor would the change be likely to affect the majority of high-level code since, as discussed above, local variable names are typically not reused. However, these changes would violate the principle of sequential consistency for the local thread (4). Hence we consider shadow registers to be a special type of variable with a special semantics designed for low-level use, and therefore believe that their behaviour does not invalidate the principles of our reordering model.
